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Introduction
The recent …nancial crisis has prompted much investigation into the role of credit-rating agencies (CRAs). With the dramatic increase in the use of structured …nance products, the agencies quickly expanded their business and earned outsized pro…ts (Moody's, for example, tripled its pro…ts between 2002 and 2006). Ratings quality seems to have su¤ered, as structured …nance products were increasingly given top ratings shortly before the …-nancial markets collapsed. In this paper, we ask how CRAs in ‡uence the structure of such products, and how the products' structure changes with market incentives.
The structuring process is marked by close collaboration between issuers and rating agencies. Issuers depend on rating agencies to certify quality and to be able to sell to regulated investors. Beyond directly paying CRAs for ratings (the "issuer pays" system), Gri¢ n and Tang (2012) write that "the CRA and underwriter may engage in discussion and iteration over assumptions made in the valuation process." Agencies also provide their models to issuers even before the negotiations take place (Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2009 ). These products are characterized by careful selection of the underlying asset pool and private information about asset quality.
We present a reputation-based two-period model of rating structured products. The model incorporates the endogenous structuring and rating of securities. Each period, an issuer has a set of safe and risky assets that it can put into a pool and issue securities against. A monopoly CRA assists in the structuring of these securities and rates them. The prospect of earning future pro…ts can give the CRA reputational incentives to provide accurate ratings.
We model reputation by positing that the CRA is long-lived and can be one of two types: truthful or opportunistic. Securities are sold to rational investors who cannot observe the type of the CRA or the quality of the securities, but who make inferences from the payo¤s realizations, ratings and the size of the asset pool. The type of the CRA is revealed between periods with an endogenous probability that depends directly on the amount of rating in ‡ation.
The issuer and CRA design securities that have a waterfall/priority structure, i.e. with junior securities that face the …rst losses and senior securities that pay out their promised amount until the value of the junior securities has gone to zero. This is a typical structure for structured …nance products (Coval, Jurek, and Sta¤ord, 2009) .
A principal motivation for securitization is to appeal to investor groups with heterogeneous preferences. The senior securities are designed to appeal not need to be heavily scrutinized by regulators. More advanced markets, consequently, deserve strict scrutiny.
We also show that rating in ‡ation is increasing in the wealth of unconstrained investors, as it allows more risky assets into the pool, decreasing the likelihood that in ‡ation is discovered. Rating in ‡ation is also increasing in the value of retaining safe assets, as this makes it more desirable to substitute risky for safe assets.
Finally, we provide two new motivations for the pooling of assets: (a) a mechanical reason of tailoring products for constrained investors; and (b) a novel explanation of the CRA balancing the informational advantage over investors with the need to maintain its reputation by choosing the right mix of safe and risky assets to include.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next subsection, we review the literature. In Section 2, we set up the model. In Section 3, we analyze the equilibrium of the second period and in Section 4 the equilibrium of the …rst period. In Section 5, we look at the determinants of rating in ‡ation in the model. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains all mathematical proofs not in the text.
Related Literature
There is substantial evidence of asymmetric information and strategic asset pool selection for structured …nance products. 1 There is also much empirical support for our …nding that rating in ‡ation is an important element of structured …nance. 2 In the theory literature, Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009), Fulghieri, Strobl, and Xia (2014), Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013), and Strausz (2005) examine dynamic models of certi…cation agencies with reputation concerns. 3 Our model of reputation is similar, but we allow for multiple risky assets, which permits the CRA to tranche securities as well as rate them.
Daley, Green, and Vanasco (2017a, 2017b) examine the interaction between retention, security design, ratings, and origination. Ratings in their main model are similar to public information. We focus on a CRA's strategic incentives to undertake security design and ratings. 1 See, e.g., Downing, Ja¤ee, and Wallace (2009), An, Deng, and Gabriel (2011), Elul (2011) , and Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2011). 2 See, e.g., Gorton and Metrick (2013), Cornaggia, Cornaggia, and Hund (2017), Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2011), Vickery (2012), Gri¢ n and Tang (2012), He, Qian, and Strahan (2012), and Stanton and Wallace (2012). 3 There is a large recent theoretical literature on CRAs, including Sangiorgi and Spatt (2017), Cohn, Rajan, and Strobl (2016) , and Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012). 4 Opp, Opp, and Harris (2013) examine how ratings-contingent regulation a¤ects the informativeness of ratings in a setting where a CRA rates risky projects with binary outcomes. The constrained investors in our model rely on a rating that states it respects a rating standard. The rating standard may depend on regulation. However, the standard may be violated in our model by the CRA. Moreover, we allow for security design.
Model
There are three types of agents in the model: issuers, investors, and a CRA. All agents are risk-neutral. We begin by focusing on issuers.
Issuers
The issuer has two types of assets that it would like to sell to a set of investors: risky assets and safe assets. Risky assets pay o¤X per unit, a random variable distributed uniformly over the unit interval. For simplicity, the payo¤s of di¤erent risky assets are assumed to be perfectly correlated with each other. Risky assets are worth r 2 (0; 1=2) to the issuer. Safe assets pay o¤ 1 per unit with probability one. They are worth s 2 (2r; 1) to the issuer.
The issuer's valuations of the assets are lower than the investors'values for the assets. This can occur for several reasons: the issuer may have valuable alternative investment opportunities, regulatory capital requirements for holding the assets, and/or the need to transfer risk o¤ of its balance sheet. The assumption that s > 2r implies that under full information the net profits to the issuer from selling a dollar of risky assets is greater than the net pro…ts from selling a dollar of safe assets.
The issuer's supply of safe assets is > 0 and its supply of risky assets is large (for simplicity, we assume it is in…nite). 4 We denote the measure of safe assets the issuer includes in the securitization pool by I and the measure of risky assets by I .
Investors
There are two types of investors: unconstrained, U , with aggregate wealth w U > 0 and constrained, C, with aggregate wealth w C > 0. 5 Constrained investors can only purchase securities that receive an investment grade rating. We de…ne investment grade ratings below. Constrained investors may be constrained by regulations (for example, banks, pension funds, and insurance companies are often restricted in the types of assets they may hold), internal by-law restrictions, or their portfolio hedging requirements. The unconstrained investors are willing to purchase any security. These investors may be hedge funds or other institutional investors. We assume that both types of investors are rational, in the sense that they update given available information and maximize their expected payo¤s. 6 Investors' reservation utility is normalized to zero.
Securitization
With the help of a credit rating agency (CRA), the issuer can issue securities backed by a portfolios of safe and risky assets for investors through securitization. We de…ne securitization as creating a senior and junior tranche with a waterfall/priority structure. This means that if the payo¤ of the underlying pool of assets is su¢ ciently large, both tranches receive a payo¤; the senior tranche receives its promised repayment and the junior tranche receives the residual. When the payo¤ of the pool is su¢ ciently low, the junior tranche receives nothing, and the senior tranche receives the whole payo¤ (which may be below the payo¤ promised to them). This model is a stylized version of how securitization works (see Coval, Jurek, and Sta¤ord (2009) for a detailed description of the process). 7 Formally, suppose that the CRA in conjunction with the issuer decides on the assets to include in the pool and how to structure it. To simplify this process for the model, we assume the CRA's fee gives it a fraction f of the surplus from the issuance. The issuer and the CRA decide jointly on the number of safe and risky assets to include in the securitization and the speci…cation of the structure of the senior and junior tranches. For simplicity of exposition, we will refer to all decisions as being made by the CRA.
More precisely, suppose the CRA can market the securities of a junior tranche and a senior tranche. The junior tranche securities are intended for unconstrained investors, while the senior tranche securities are intended for 6 There has been much discussion about the naïveté of investors in the RMBS market; e.g. Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012). However, not all structured …nance markets are necessarily characterized in such a way, as Stanton and Wallace (2012) point out: "All agents in the CMBS market can reasonably be viewed as sophisticated, informed investors." 7 In a previous version of this paper, we modelled pass-through securities, where investors get pro-rata shares of cash ‡ows from the underlying mortgages. 6 constrained investors. Let z I 2 0; I + I be the face value of the senior tranche -i.e. the total payo¤ of the senior securities if they are paid in full. The senior tranche securities are paid in full if and only if the payo¤ of all assets in the pool is su¢ cient to make this payment:
De…ne x I as the the realization ofX such that the inequality binds:
For realizations x ofX below x I , the senior tranche receives the total payo¤ of the pool and the junior tranche receives nothing. Notice that having the CRA choose the face value of the senior tranche, z I , is equivalent to having the CRA choose the cuto¤ x I 2 [0; 1]. As it will be notationally simpler to use the cuto¤ x I , we do so in most of the paper. The realized payo¤ of the senior tranche is thus:
and its expected payo¤:
The realized payo¤ of the junior tranche is the residual value of the pool:
and its expected value:
From the above, it follows that the realized payo¤ of the entire pool equals:
The CRA
We assumed that constrained investors are constrained in the sense that they may only purchase investment grade securities. We thus need to de…ne the criteria a CRA uses for ratings.
Ratings
The simplest approach to de…ne the rating criteria is to quantify the probability of default. We de…ne an investment grade rating as signifying that the probability the senior tranche is not paid in full is less than or equal to an exogenous probability P 2 [0; 1]. 8 This gives us the following ratings constraint:
which, given the uniform distribution assumption, is equivalent to stating that:
It is natural to think of the probability of default of the senior tranche, P , as exogenous to the given securitization problem. This probability may represent the historical default rate for highly rated securities that the CRA wishes to maintain, a more lax standard that the CRA applies to securitizations, or a more conservative standard that the CRA applies due to pressure from regulators or investors. We will examine how changes to this standard a¤ect ratings.
To simplify the problem, we will use a transformed version of the rating constraint:
where (1 P ) 2 R: A higher R thus means a more demanding rating constraint.
Lastly, we assume that an issuer can't sell rated securities on its own. It may sell securities, but without ratings it will not be able to access constrained investors. This is the …rst role of ratings in our model; a regulatory (or institutionalized) license to access certain clientele. Given this, the issuer may still sell to unconstrained investors. As the issuer is short lived, it faces a lemons problem, and can only include risky assets -if investors believed it included safe assets it would switch them for risky assets. This is the second role of ratings in our model; reputation allows the CRA to overcome the lemons problem and sell safe assets. If the issuer decides not to deal with the CRA, it then receives an outside option where it sells as many risky assets/securities as possible to unconstrained investors, I = 2w U for a payo¤ of:
This outside option partially determines the fee paid to the CRA (which is a share of the surplus).
Reputation
We focus on a monopoly rating agency. The CRA reduces the lemons problem through the reputation it acquires over time. There are two types of rating agencies: truthful (T ) and opportunistic (O). 9 The opportunistic CRA's announcement and its choice of tranche structure depend on its incentives. The truthful CRA is behavioral in the sense that it (a) is restricted to truthful announcements and (b) structures the securities assuming that all investors believe it is truthful. 10 The literature generally uses the behavioral player as a device to create reputational incentives for the opportunistic player. In our model, this limits the amount of rating in ‡ation that the opportunistic CRA chooses in the …rst period.
Our model has two periods. The CRA is the same for both periods, but there is a di¤erent issuer in each period. The probability of facing a truthful CRA at the beginning of the period is given by t , where t 2 f1; 2g. In period 1, the probability is a prior given by nature, and in period 2, the probability is a posterior. We assume the prior, the structure of the game, and payo¤s, are common knowledge.
The CRA perfectly observes the quality of the issuer's assets. As part of its services, the CRA structures and rates the securities o¤ered by the issuer for a fee equal to a fraction f > 0 of the surplus generated. We assume the fraction f is exogenous and it is the same in both periods and for both types of CRAs. 11 The actual fee is paid when the payo¤s are realized. While in practice the issuer will initially structure the securities and get feedback from the rating agencies about modi…cations necessary to achieve certain ratings, 12 we incorporate this back and forth into one step for simplicity. We de…ned the issuer's outside option in equation (3) . The CRA's outside option is zero.
The issuer knows the type of the CRA. Due to the surplus sharing rule, the interests of the CRA and the issuer are perfectly aligned, and the CRA can easily signal its type to the issuer through the asset composition.
Denote a message that is sent to investors by a CRA of type d 2 fT; Og and z d supplies investors with enough information to directly calculate the expected values and probabilities of given realizations of the senior and junior tranches. The opportunistic CRA may substitute risky assets for safe assets and thus worsen the actual payo¤s and in ‡ate ratings. We say that rating in ‡ation occurs when the opportunistic CRA includes a higher fraction of risky assets than reported.
To summarize, the timing of the …rst period game with is as follows:
0. Nature draws the type of the CRA. With probability 1 it's truthful and with probability 1 1 it's opportunistic.
1. The CRA speci…es the measures of safe and risky assets to be included, the face value of the senior tranche z d , and that ratings will be produced.
2. The CRA reports measures of safe and risky assets (ratings) to investors. 13 3. Investors observe the size of the pool and of the senior tranche, and the announcement of the CRA, and buy securities at their conditional expected value.
4. Payo¤s are realized and the CRA's fee paid out.
We suppose that the steps 1 to 4 are repeated in a second period and that the issuer is di¤erent in each period. Based on the message reported and payo¤ realization in the …rst period, the second-period investors update their prior about the type of the CRA accordingly. If the messages of the two types of CRAs are di¤erent, investors can deduce the type of the CRA with probability one. If the messages are identical, investors update their priors by observing the realization of security payo¤s at the end of the …rst period. We describe this updating process in detail in our analysis of the …rst period.
In what follows, we work our way backward in solving the model, beginning with the second period. We use Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium as our equilibrium concept.
The Second Period
In this section, we will analyze the second period of the game. Since this is the last period, the opportunistic CRA has no reputation concerns. We begin by describing the behavior of the truthful CRA, as it does not act strategically (i.e., it doesn't take into account the fact that investors perceive it to be opportunistic with positive probability). Note that the behavior of the truthful CRA will be the same in both periods, as it doesn't recognize the need for reputation management and the issuers in each period have the same characteristics. Thereafter we derive the equilibrium behavior of the opportunistic CRA.
The truthful CRA
The truthful CRA maximizes its revenues disregarding the behavior of the opportunistic CRA. It solves the following program:
The objective function is the expected surplus generated by the CRA from selling securities to investors. The expected fee is a fraction f > 0 of this expression. The …rst constraint is the resource constraint for safe assets. The second constraint is the rating constraint, which implies that the probability that the senior tranche will pay out less then its full amount is P or less. The third constraint is the budget constraint of constrained investors, which makes use of the expected payo¤ of the senior tranche in equation (1) . The fourth constraint is the budget constraint of unconstrained investors, which makes use of the expected payo¤ of the junior tranche in equation (2) .
In the Appendix, we prove that the budget constraint of unconstrained investors binds in any solution ( T ; T ; x T ) to the truthful CRA's optimization program, and moreover that any solution has T > 0. This allows us to simplify the program considerably and to prove the following proposition, where we make use of the de…nition W w C +w U w U =R, which is explained below.
Proposition 1
The solution to the truthful CRA's problem has the following properties:
i. If W 0, the budget constraint of the constrained investors and the non-negativity constraint for safe assets bind, implying:
ii. If 0 < W , the rating constraint and the budget constraint of the constrained investors bind, implying:
iii. If W > , the rating constraint and the resource constraint bind, implying:
The variable W represents the value of safe assets that the truthful CRA prefers to allocate to the pool when all it has to worry about is the rating standard and the budgets of investors. When constrained investors have more wealth, the truthful CRA …nds it more pro…table to include more safe assets and appeal to them. The opposite e¤ect holds for unconstrained investors. When the rating standard is higher, the truthful CRA includes more safe assets to satisfy it. Since the measures of included assets can't be negative, the truthful CRA will not include any safe assets when W is negative. Finally, if W is larger than the supply of safe assets, , the truthful CRA will include a measure of safe assets equal to this supply.
We will start by solving for an equilibrium when W > 0, and revisit the case when W 0 in the next section. Note that for W > 0, T = 2w U =R, whereas T = min fw C + w U (1 1=R) ; g.
The opportunistic CRA
In this subsection, we examine the strategic choices of the opportunistic CRA.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, any securitization rated by the opportunistic CRA in the second period will only include risky assets in the pool of assets.
The lemons problem here has two elements. First, risky assets have a higher margin than safe ones for the CRA. Second, investors do not observe the actual composition of assets. Therefore if the opportunistic CRA includes some safe assets and investor beliefs are …xed such that they anticipate these safe assets will be included, the opportunistic CRA has the incentive to replace the safe assets with risky assets. This problem arises directly from the existence of constrained investors -it is pro…table to include safe assets in the pool (when W > 0) to be able to sell to constrained investors, which then allows for rating in ‡ation (replacing safe assets with risky ones) to take place.
We say that the two types of CRAs pool at an information set where they are both called upon to act, if they report the same messages, include the same quantity of assets in the asset pools, and choose the same sizes of their senior tranches in equilibrium. If the two types of CRAs do not pool at such an information set, we say that they separate.
Lemma 2 For W > 0, if the type of the opportunistic CRA is not fully revealed in the …rst period, the opportunistic CRA pools with the truthful CRA in the second period.
If there were an equilibrium where the two types separated in the second period in spite of a positive posterior, the opportunistic CRA would be recognized, and would therefore only be able to sell securities backed by risky assets. For W > 0, this gives strictly lower revenues than the truthful CRA's pool that included safe assets, and therefore there is a pro…table deviation. It is easy to see that a pooling equilibrium exists for o¤-the-equilibrium path beliefs such that any deviation is believed to be the opportunistic CRA for sure.
For a given posterior 2 2 (0; 1), the corresponding second-period surplus created by the opportunistic CRA is given by:
The revenues received depends on investors' beliefs about the type of the CRA. With probability 2 , the CRA is truthful, and includes T safe assets worth 1 per unit and T risky assets worth on average 1=2 per unit. With complementary probability, the CRA is opportunistic and includes only risky assets, but ensures that the number of assets is equal to the total number of assets the truthful CRA includes ( T + T ). As these assets are all risky, they are worth on average 1=2. The opportunity cost of selling o¤ those assets for the issuer is the quantity of assets multiplied by their payo¤ if retained r. Lastly the issuer can earn w U (1 2r) by securitizing without the CRA's help.
We can simplify this expression:
sell/issue a bond against. Investors don't want to invest in the bad asset, and rely on the CRA to screen the asset. However, the CRA may earn more by rating a bad asset good. For examples of this type of model, see Fulghieri et al (2014) and Piccolo and Shapiro (2018) . Here, there are no bad assets, as risky assets are also NPV positive and investors are risk neutral. 14 2 ( 2 ) = 2
If the type of the opportunistic CRA is revealed to investors in period one ( 2 = 0), then it will include only risky assets. We derive the optimal tranching by the opportunistic CRA for this case in the following lemma (see Appendix B for a proof):
Lemma 3 If investors know the type of the opportunistic CRA ( 2 = 0) in period 2, it will include a measure O 2 = T = 2w U =R of risky assets and no safe assets in the pool. The corresponding surplus is given by:
Notice that even though only risky assets are included in the result of the lemma, the opportunistic CRA can still sell securities to constrained investors, as they are made safer through tranching.
Lastly, we derive the di¤erence between the second period surplus when the CRA is pooling and when it is separating:
The First Period
In this section, we analyze the strategic choice of the opportunistic CRA in the …rst period. The following lemma demonstrates that there are no separating equilibria in the …rst period.
Lemma 4
There is no equilibrium where the opportunistic CRA separates in the …rst period.
If the opportunistic CRA separated in the …rst period, it would have a strictly lower payo¤ in the second period than the payo¤ from pooling (see equation (4)). The truthful CRA makes the same choices in the …rst period as in the second period. Therefore, the opportunistic CRA can also guarantee a higher payo¤ by pooling with the truthful CRA in the …rst period, using the logic of Lemma 2 and the knowledge that it will get a higher payo¤ than separating in the second period. We can thus restrict ourselves to looking only at pooling equilibria in the …rst period.
In any pooling equilibrium, the opportunistic CRA chooses the same size of the pool as the truthful CRA ( T + T ) and the same face value of the senior tranche (z T ), but may include a larger measure of risky assets, O 1 . A property of the uniform distribution is used here to simplify the problem. The likelihood ratio between the density function of the aggregate payo¤ of the assets pooled by the truthful CRA and the aggregate payo¤ of the assets pooled by the opportunistic CRA is constant for aggregate payo¤ realizations above T . Hence, if investors know the aggregate payo¤ realization is above this level, then no additional information can be learned about the type of the CRA from knowing the exact aggregate payo¤ realization.
Moreover, if the aggregate payo¤ could have come from either type of CRA, then no inference can be made about the type of the CRA by observing the di¤erent payo¤ realizations of the two tranches. The reason is that, identical aggregate payo¤ realizations are split in the same fashion between the junior and senior tranches created by truthful and opportunistic CRAs.
In conclusion, no inference can be made about the type of the CRA, unless the aggregate payo¤ realization is below T , the minimum payo¤ of the truthful CRA's pool, as this could not have been generated by a truthful CRA. Given the distribution of the risky asset's payo¤s, the opportunistic type is therefore discovered ( 2 = 0) with probability:
With the complementary probability, T = O 1 , the type of the opportunistic CRA will not be revealed by the payo¤ realization and instead investors will increase their posterior probability that the CRA is truthful in the second period to:
In any pooling equilibrium, the opportunistic CRA's choice of the measure of risky assets to include in the pool, O 1 ; must be optimal given the …rst-period choice of the truthful CRA, T ; T ; z T . Furthermore, the beliefs of investors are held …xed when the opportunistic CRA chooses the amount of risky assets to include, meaning that the choice does not a¤ect the revenues received. We denote the amount of risky assets that investors expect to be included in the pool by an opportunistic CRA by must be a solution to the following maximization problem:
The …rst line represents the revenues in the …rst period. As the price depends on the equilibrium beliefs of investors, and the quantity is observable and identical for both types of CRAs, revenues are held …xed in the decision problem for the opportunistic CRA. The second line represents the issuer's opportunity cost of not holding on to the assets and the payo¤ it could obtain without the CRA. The third and fourth lines represent the expected secondperiod surplus, which depends on the probability that the CRA is discovered or not. Note that the probability depends on the opportunistic CRA's choice, as more distortion away from the reported value make it more likely to be discovered. The equilibrium second-period surplus does not depend on this choice, as the beliefs of investors about the updated type of the CRA are held …xed. Thus, the trade-o¤ for the opportunistic CRA is to increase its payo¤ by retaining more safe assets and placing more risky assets in the pool versus having a higher probability of enjoying future rents. Finally, as the CRA receives a fraction of the surplus f in both periods, we leave it out of the maximization problem.
The above program is convex in O 1 since the second derivative equals:
Hence, we will have a corner solution. The two possible solutions are (a) maximal rating in ‡ation, in which the opportunistic CRA includes only risky assets (
zero rating in ‡ation, where the opportunistic CRA includes the same measure of risky assets as the truthful CRA (
. Under maximal rating in ‡ation, the posterior belief about the probability that the CRA is truthful is:
An equilibrium with maximal in ‡ation can be sustained if the expected surplus with the truthful CRA's amount of risky assets
T is smaller than the expected surplus with the maximal amount
Notice that here, the …rst period revenues are the same in both scenarios and are not included, as this looks at a deviation where beliefs are held …xed. The …rst period opportunity cost of including assets di¤er, as the assets included are di¤erent, and thus appear on both sides.
For zero rating in ‡ation, the posterior belief is equal to the prior, 1 . Therefore, an equilibrium with zero rating in ‡ation can be sustained if the expected surplus with the same amount of risky assets as the truthful CRA,
T ; is larger than the expected surplus with the maximal amount
The above implies the following equilibrium actions:
The intuition behind these expressions is simple. If the current gain from in ‡ating ratings (substituting risky assets for safe assets) is higher than the present value of the future surplus from being more truthful, then the opportunistic CRA prefers to in ‡ate ratings as much as possible. If the present value of the future surplus from truthful ratings is higher than the current gain from in ‡ating ratings, then the opportunistic CRA prefers not to in ‡ate ratings at all.
These expressions de…ne discount factors for which maximal rating in ‡a-tion and truthtelling are equilibria. Maximal rating in ‡ation is an equilibrium when the discount factor is below a cuto¤, which we de…ne as . Plugging in second-period payo¤s, this cuto¤ is de…ned as:
No rating in ‡ation is an equilibrium when the discount factor is above a cuto¤, which we de…ne as . Plugging in second-period payo¤s, this cuto¤ is de…ned as:
Note also that since second-period surplus is increasing in the posterior beliefs, 1 < 0 2 and thus > , for W > 0. This means that there is a range of such that neither maximal nor minimal in ‡ation is part of an equilibrium. For such , we conjecture that there are equilibria in mixed strategies where the opportunistic CRA chooses maximal rating in ‡ation with probability p 2 (0; 1) and zero rating in ‡ation with probability 1 p in period one. 15 15 Due to the convexity of the objective function, we can rule out mixed equilibria where asset allocations with intermediate in ‡ation are played with positive probability.
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The posterior in period two conditional on the risky assets defaulting will be:
Note that 2 . The opportunistic CRA will be indi¤erent between the two extremes whenever:
Hence, for every such that
there is a unique mixed equilibrium p . We can solve for this equilibrium using the indi¤erence condition (equation (8)) and plugging in the pro…ts from equation (4):
giving:
We have thus established the following results.
Proposition 2 If W > 0; in the …rst period, the opportunistic CRA's equilibrium choice is: (a) in ‡ating maximally if , (b) reporting truthfully if , and (c) in ‡ating maximally with probability p 2 (0; 1) and reporting truthfully with probability 1 p if 2 ; .
Recall that for any W > 0; the measure of risky assets included by the truthful CRA is given by the formula T = 2w U =R and the measure of safe assets T = min fw C + w U (1 1=R) ; g. We make these substitutions in the expressions for , and p in Appendix C.
Only risky assets
If W 0, the truthful CRA includes only risky assets. This implies that the opportunistic CRA will not substitute safe assets for risky in equilibrium and include only risky assets as well. The opportunistic CRA will issue the same type of securities as the truthful CRA in both periods and there will be no rating in ‡ation. Even though there are only risky assets, due to tranching, there will still be a safer senior tranche (with x T = 1 p w U = (w C + w U )) and a riskier junior tranche. Rewriting the inequality W < 0 as
reveals when it is preferable to include only risky assets and not in ‡ate ratings. First, the wealth of constrained investors must be su¢ ciently low, since the size of the senior tranche that can be made from only risky assets is limited. Second, the wealth of unconstrained investors must be su¢ ciently high, to be able to include enough risky assets to create the senior tranche. Lastly, the rating constraint must be su¢ ciently lax (low R) to enable the creation of the the senior tranche. In addition to the absence of rating in ‡ation, this equilibrium con…guration has the bene…t of maximizing the expected surplus given this set of parameters, since the budget of the constrained and unconstrained investors is exhausted, the pro…t margin is higher for risky than for safe assets, and the opportunistic CRA will be hired in period two with probability one.
Rating In ‡ation
Rating in ‡ation is a direct measure of surplus in our model. It measures:
The size of the lemons problem: The …rst best allocation is given by the solution of the truthful CRA; when W > 0, it is optimal to sell safe assets as well as risky assets. Distortions away from this allocation reduce surplus. The opportunistic CRA can't resist substituting risky assets for safe ones, but it is to its own detriment, as investors take into account this behavior. The extreme form of this behavior is when it fully in ‡ates ratings, and includes only risky assets. Reputation allows the opportunistic CRA to partially circumvent this problem and include some safe assets.
How much risk investors are taking on: Regulators often outsource the assessment of how much risk certain …nancial institutions (banks, insurance companies, pensions) take on to the ratings industry. We don't model directly why the investment grade threshold is important, but its use in monitoring for regulatory purposes demonstrates that there are negative consequences from circumventing the threshold. Becker and Ivashina (2015) and E…ng (2018) document institutions' (insurance companies and banks, respectively) e¤orts to arbitrage ratings by reaching for yield. Rating in ‡ation in our model is a measure of by how much the opportunistic CRA is violating the investment grade threshold -causing a buildup of risk and facilitating the reach for yield.
In this section, we will …rst analyze the e¤ect of small changes of some of the parameters on rating in ‡ation and, thereafter, large changes.
Local comparative statics
We use three metrics to measure increases in rating in ‡ation for W > 0:
1. There is no rating in ‡ation when . Therefore if increases, the range of discount factors for which there is no rating in ‡ation shrinks.
There is maximal rating in ‡ation when
. Therefore if increases, the range of discount factors for which there is maximal rating in ‡ation increases.
3. In the mixed equilibrium ( < < ), p is the probability with which maximal rating in ‡ation is chosen. Thus, we interpret an increase in p as an increase in rating in ‡ation.
We examine how the parameters of the model a¤ect rating in ‡ation in the following proposition:
The above results follow immediately from the expressions for p ; and (see Appendix C), but we include a proof of the comparative statics with respect to the prior 1 in Appendix D, since it is slightly more involved.
We highlight three intriguing results from the proposition and summarize the rest. First, rating in ‡ation is decreasing in the tightness of the rating constraint. There are two e¤ects. One is that a tighter rating constraint makes it harder to sell in period 2, reducing the surplus, which increases rating in ‡ation. Another is that a tighter rating constraint makes it harder to include risky assets, which increases the likelihood that the opportunistic CRA in period 1 is caught cheating investors. Proposition 3 demonstrates that the second e¤ect is stronger in our model. The increase in the tightness of the rating constraint may come from investor scrutiny or regulation, and is e¤ective.
Second, rating in ‡ation is increasing in the wealth of unconstrained investors. Increasing demand from such investors makes the truthful CRA include more risky assets in the pool, decreasing the likelihood that an in‡ating opportunistic CRA is discovered. In addition, it reduces the di¤erence between the second-period surplus when the opportunistic CRA is discovered and when it is not. Thus an in ‡ow of money/investment (perhaps due to easy lending) by unconstrained investors such as hedge funds can foster an environment of rating in ‡ation. Third, rating in ‡ation increases in the value of retaining safe assets, as the opportunistic CRA will have a higher desire to substitute risky for safe assets. The value of retaining safe assets may depend on the demand for safe assets, which have extra value due to their money-like features and use for collateral (Diamond, 2017) .
We brie ‡y summarize the other e¤ects. Rating in ‡ation decreases in the prior that the CRA is truthful, due to the increase in the period 2 payo¤. In the intermediate case (0 < W ), when the constrained investors'budget constraint binds, rating in ‡ation decreases in the wealth of constrained investors. The reason is that their wealth improves the second-period surplus, while at the same time increasing the probability that the opportunistic CRA is discovered after the …rst period. A similar result holds for the amount of safe assets when the resource constraint for safe assets binds (W > ).
Global comparative statics
In this subsection, we analyze the e¤ect of large changes in R on rating in ‡ation.
De…ne (R) ( (R)) as the lower (upper) discount threshold evaluated at R. Assume > (R = 1), and let R be de…ned implicitly by = (R =R ) and R by = (R = R) (in Appendix E we show that both exist and are unique under this assumption). Figure 1 depicts the discount factor thresholds in ( ; R) space.
Notice that these functions aren't de…ned for all R. This is because when W 0, the truthful CRA does not include any safe assets and hence there is no possibility of rating in ‡ation. De…neR w U = (w U + w C ), the value of R such that W = 0. It follows immediately thatR 2 (0; 1). In Figure 1 , R = 0:25, the point where the discount factor curves asymptotically approach in…nity from the right.
Using Proposition 3, it is straightforward to derive the following proposition, where we write p (R) to denote the mixed strategy evaluated at R 2 R ; R .
Proposition 4
For any …nite > (1), in the …rst period the opportunistic CRA:
(a) reports truthfully for R R (b) in ‡ates maximally for R 2 (R;R ], (c) in ‡ates maximally with probability p (R) and reports truthfully with probability 1 p (R) for R 2 R ; R , (d) reports truthfully for R 2 [ R; 1].
This proposition demonstrates that rating in ‡ation may be non-monotonic in the rating standard R. 16 For low R, it is more pro…table for the truthful CRA to include only risky assets. Hence, there is no room for the opportunistic CRA to in ‡ate. For intermediate R, it is more pro…table for the truthful CRA to include safe assets. Hence, the opportunistic CRA will in‡ate ratings, substituting risky assets for safe assets. For high R, part (d) of the Proposition shows that ratings may return to being truthful. Here, the truthful CRA will include more safe assets which makes it easier to discover a cheating opportunistic CRA. One might imagine that low rating standards prevail when …nancial products are new and have little track record or established models to estimate their risk. In this case the CRA will only include risky assets, but is still able to create some safe securities from them. As these products become more well understood, rating standards increase, but that opens up the possibility of rating in ‡ation. Finally, if rating in ‡ation becomes too pervasive and disruptive, regulatory and investor pressure may increase standards further, which could reduce rating in ‡ation.
Nevertheless, within the model (i.e. abstracting away from the externalities of rating in ‡ation and risk buildup), rating standards are a constraint imposed on the solution. Therefore, the solution with lower rating standards with no in ‡ation has higher surplus than the solution with higher rating standards with no in ‡ation.
Conclusion
In this paper, we derive the equilibrium of a simple model of security design where a CRA with reputation concerns both designs and rates securities. We show that the observed equilibrium outcome and rating in ‡ation are sensitive to the investment grade standard as well as the relative demand by constrained and unconstrained investors. Intriguingly, for some parameters, the most e¢ cient outcome (which has no rating in ‡ation), is observed for 16 Note that if we change the assumption in the proposition to (1), the opportunistic CRA will still in ‡ate maximally for intermediate values of R, but it will no longer report truthfully with probability one for high enough R. More precisely, if
(1), it will in ‡ate maximally for all R 2 (R;1]; and if (1) < (1), it will in ‡ate maximally for R 2 (R;R ] and play the mixed equilibrium for R 2 (R ; 1]. low rating standard. The non-monotonicity of rating in ‡ation with respect to rating standards may be an important concern to regulators. It would be of interest to study further possible systemic e¤ects of rating in ‡ation.
T = w C and T = 0, the constrained investors' budget constraint cannot be relaxed, but this cannot be a solution since a strictly higher payo¤ can be achieved by setting x T = 0; T = w C , and T = 2w U ). Hence, after the reduction in x T it is possible to increase T slightly without violating any constraint. Once again, the suggested solution can be improved upon since the objective function is strictly increasing in T -a contradiction.
C Discount-factor cuto¤s and mixed equilibrium C.1 Intermediate W If W 2 (0; ], T = 2w U =R and T = w C + w U w U =R. Substituting in the formulas for the discount-factor cuto¤s and the mixed-strategy equilibrium gives: = 2 (s r) 
:
Analogously to the previous case, p equals zero for = and one for = .
D Proof of Proposition 3 (Local comparative
statics with respect to 1 )
The only comparative static which is non-trivial to demonstrate is the change in p with respect to 1 . We prove that p is decreasing in 1 . De…ne:
C ( ) 1 2 (s r) =
(1 2r) T = ( T + T ) ;
and note that A > 1 since T > 0. Using this notation, the mixed strategy can be written:
This expression equals one for = . Hence, we can solve for C ( ).
Di¤erentiating p with respect to 1 gives:
2 :
We will show that this expression is negative. The mixed strategy is de…ned for 2 ; (at the boundaries it is degenerate), but since C ( ) is increasing in , it is enough to show the sign for = .
E Proof of Proposition 4 (Global comparative statics with respect to R) Lemma 6 For any …nite > (R = 1), there are unique values R and R such that (R ) = and ( R) = .
